B. Opinion of Others

16. [Exposition of the opinion] - Hence as concerns this point [n.15] one statement is as follows, that the power of generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father but not in the Son.

17. This statement is clarified in two ways:

First, because omnipotence is power for everything that does not include a contradiction; but that the Father generates does not include a contradiction, while that the Son generates does include a contradiction;     therefore etc     .

18. Further, second, because what holds of actions that are transitive, or pass onward to something external, is different from what holds of actions that are immanent; possibility in the case of a transitive action is judged from the idea of the action in itself and from its term, while possibility in the case of an immanent action is not judged exclusively from these features but also from comparison with the agent which such action is immanent in; since therefore generation is an immanent action, its possibility is to be judged not only from it in itself and from its term but also from its being compossible with the acting supposit which it should be immanent in; but generation is compossible with the Father and not with the Son, therefore the same as before.

19. A third clarification is added that that is said to be ‘potent’ which has power for everything for which it has the form, and is said to be ‘impotent’ for that action to which its form does not extend (as fire is said to be ‘impotent’ because it cannot cool things, for it does not have the form for cooling); but the Father has a form that agrees with generation and the Son does not; therefore the Father is impotent if he cannot generate but the Son is not impotent if he be unable to generate, - and so ‘being able to generate’ pertains to the omnipotence of the Father and not to the omnipotence of the Son.

20. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this:

Without comparing the ‘to generate’ with any supposit I ask: either this generating, as it belongs to the generated supposit as to a term, is something for which some active power is naturally fit, or it is not. If it is, then whatever does not have power for this generating does not have omnipotence (that is, it does not have power for everything for which power is naturally fit); if it is not, then nothing has this power for generating, and thus this power does not pertain to the omnipotence of the Father.

21. The confirmations too [nn.18-19] are not valid. Not the secondVatican editors: the text actually says ‘the first’ because it is first in the Lectura though second here, just as the text says ‘the second’ in n.22 because it is second in the Lectura but third here. The one that is first here [n.17] lacks an argument against it. ⁵⁵ [n.18] because omnipotence is capable of everything which is the term of power simply, and this either by producing it in that which it is of a nature to be produced in, if it is of a nature to be produced in something, or by producing it as subsistent in itself, if it is not of a nature to be produced in something. But there is no necessity that omnipotence be able to produce all such things formally in themselves; just as omnipotence can produce running in an animal (as in a man or a horse), which is what running is of a nature to be in, but cannot produce running in itself (as neither can it produce running formally), because this neuter word ‘itself’ would signify that such a form existed in itself formally. Although therefore the Son not be able to generate formally such that generation should be in himself, nor be able to be a principle of generation in himself, yet, if generation be a term of omnipotence, then one should say that the Son is able to be a principle of generation in that which generation is of a nature to be in, because otherwise he would not be omnipotent, just as neither would he be omnipotent if he could not cause understanding in an intellect capable of receiving understanding. But ‘to generate’ cannot in any way be from the Son, not even as it is in the Son - therefore if ‘to generate’ is a term of power simply the Son will not be omnipotent.

22. The third confirmation [n.19] is not valid, because what has a form that is limited with respect to acting is not omnipotent with respect to acting; for although fire be potent as to burning and heating, if yet it be not able to cool it will not be simply omnipotent, because its form - limited to one act - entails that it is not simply omnipotent; therefore that the Son does not have a form agreeing with every action, although the action is one which power is of a nature to have simply regard to, entails that the Son is not simply potent.

23. Again, this way [n.16] does not save the fact of how the Father and the Son are equally potent, because the Father has power for an act of generation (which, for you [sc. the holder of the opinion in question here, nn.16-18] is a term of power simply), for which action the Son does not have power, and so they will not be equally powerful as to extent.